Abstract-With recent developments in wireless communication technologies, malicious users can use them to commit crimes or launch terror attacks, thus imposing new threats on public security. To quickly respond to these attacks, authorized parities need to intervene in the malicious communication links over the air. This paper investigates the emerging wireless communication intervention problem at the physical layer. Unlike prior studies using jamming to disrupt or disable the targeted wireless communications, we propose a new physical-layer spoofing approach to change their communicated information. Consider an abstract three-node model over additive white Gaussian noise channels, in which a legitimate spoofer aims to spoof a malicious communication link from a malicious transmitter to a malicious receiver, such that the received message at the receiver is changed from the transmitter's originally sent message to the one desired by the spoofer. We propose a new symbollevel spoofing scheme, where the spoofer designs the spoofing signal by exploiting the symbol-level relationship between each original constellation point of the transmitter and the desirable one of the spoofer. In particular, the spoofer aims to minimize the average spoofing-symbol-error-rate (SSER), which is defined as the average probability that the symbols decoded by the malicious receiver fail to be changed or spoofed, by designing its spoofing signals over symbols subject to the average transmit power constraint. By considering two cases when the malicious transmitter employs the widely-used binary phase-shift keying and quadrature phase-shift keying modulations, we obtain the respective optimal solutions to the two average SSER minimization problems. Numerical results show that the symbollevel spoofing scheme with optimized transmission achieves a much lower average SSER, as compared with other benchmark schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION

R
ECENT technological advancements have enabled increasing use of infrastructure-free wireless communications. For example, smartphone users can exchange information with each other by exploiting Wi-Fi and Bluetooth to form local multi-hop connections, or using the fifth-generation (5G) cellular device-to-device communications; and even multiple unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and ground stations can be connected with each other as multi-hop networks to exchange photos and videos in real time. Although these infrastructurefree communication links bring great convenience to our daily lives, they can also be used by malicious users to launch various security attacks. For instance, terrorists can use peerto-peer Wi-Fi connections to communicate and facilitate terror attacks, and criminals can control UAVs to spy and collect private information from rightful users. As such malicious attacks are launched via infrastructure-free wireless communications, they are difficult to be monitored by solely using existing information surveillance methods that intercept the communication data at the cellular or Internet infrastructures. 1 In response to such new threats on public security, authorized parties such as government agencies should develop new approaches to legitimately surveil these suspicious wireless communication links over the air (e.g., via eavesdropping) to detect malicious attacks, and then intervene in them (e.g., via jamming and spoofing) to quickly defend and disable these attacks [3] .
There have been several recent studies in the literature that investigate the surveillance of wireless communications, where authorized parties efficiently intercept suspicious wireless communication links, extract their exchanged data contents, and help identify the malicious wireless communication links to intervene in. Conventionally, the methods for wireless communications surveillance include wiretapping of wireless operators' infrastructures and installation of monitoring software in smartphones. Recently, over-the-air eavesdropping has emerged as a new wireless communications surveillance method. Among others, passive eavesdropping (see, e.g., [2] ) and proactive eavesdropping [4] - [8] are two approaches implemented at the physical layer, in which authorized parties can deploy dedicated wireless monitors to overhear the targeted wireless communications, especially the infrastructure-free ones.
Efficient surveillance can help detect and identify malicious users and their communications. After that, authorized parties need to quickly respond and defend them via wireless communication intervention. For example, the security agency may need to disrupt, disable, or spoof ongoing terrorists' communications to prevent terror attacks at the planning stage, and it is also desirable to change the control signal of a malicious UAV to land it in a targeted location and catch it. In the literature, physical-layer jamming (see, e.g., [9] - [16] ) is one existing approach that can be employed to intervene in malicious communications, though it was originally proposed for military instead of public security applications. In the physical-layer jamming, the jammer sends artificially generated Gaussian noise (so-called "uncorrelated jamming" [9] - [13] ) or a processed version of the malicious signal (so-called "correlated jamming" [14] - [16] ) to disrupt or disable the targeted malicious wireless communications. However, jamming the targeted communications at the physical layer is easy to be detected, and may not be sufficient to successfully intervene in malicious activities. This is due to the fact that when the targeted communication continuously fails due to the jamming attack, the malicious users may take counter-measures by changing their communication frequency bands or switching to another way of communications. Thus, we are motivated to study a new wireless communication intervention via spoofing at the physical layer, which can keep the malicious communication but change the communicated information to intervene in.
We investigate the physical-layer spoofing of a two-hop malicious communication link as shown in Fig. 1 , where a legitimate spoofer aims to change the communicated information from a source to a destination through a relay. We consider that the legitimate spoofer accesses the two-hop network by pretending to be another relay node. Practically, this is implemented by the legitimate spoofer first eavesdropping the malicious communications to acquire the key used for authentication and then joining the two-hop network as a fake relay node (see, e.g., [2] , [19] ). Being a fake relay, the legitimate spoofer can thus cooperate with the malicious nodes to obtain the channel state information (CSI) and the symbol format (e.g., modulation and coding schemes) of the two-hop link, and synchronize with the two-hop transmission. For example, as the destination treats the legitimate spoofer as a trusted relay in the malicious network, it can individually estimate the CSI from both the relay and the legitimate spoofer (fake relay) based on their transmitted pilot signals, and then send the estimated CSI back to both of them. In this case, The system model with a spoofer aiming to purposely change the information content transmitted from the malicious transmitter to the malicious receiver.
the legitimate spoofer obtains the CSI of both relay links required to implement the proposed symbol-level spoofing later. Furthermore, we consider that the legitimate spoofer can decode the communicated data from the source to the relay in the first hop, and then implement a new symbol-level spoofing approach to spoof the malicious destination in the second hop. As will be presented later, by exploiting the known data or symbol information and CSI of the malicious link, the symbol-level spoofing is an efficient spoofing approach at the physical layer that is difficult to be discovered by malicious users.
In this paper, we particularly focus on the symbol-level spoofing in the second hop of the malicious communication system in Fig. 1 , which is abstracted as a three-node model in Fig. 2 . We consider this three-node model over additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels, where the legitimate spoofer perfectly knows the transmitted information by the malicious transmitter a-priori, and aims to change the received message at the malicious receiver from the transmitter's originally sent message to the one desired by the spoofer. Note that the malicious transmitter and the malicious receiver in Fig. 2 correspond to the relay and the destination node in Fig. 1 , respectively. Under this setup, we propose a symbollevel spoofing approach, in which the spoofer designs the spoofing signals via exploiting the symbol-level relationship between each original constellation point of the transmitter and the desirable one of the spoofer, so as to optimize the spoofing performance. In particular, we consider two cases when the malicious transmitter employs the widely-used binary phase-shift keying (BPSK) and quadrature phase-shift keying (QPSK) modulations, respectively. 2 The objective of the spoofer is to minimize the average spoofing-symbol-errorrate (SSER), i.e., the average probability that the symbols decoded by the malicious receiver fail to be changed as the desirable ones of the spoofer. The main results of this paper are summarized as follows.
• In the BPSK case (with the constellation points being ±1), the spoofing signals are designed by classifying the symbols into two types. In each of Type-I symbols (see Fig. 3 -(a)), where the original constellation point of the malicious transmitter and the desirable one of the spoofer are identical (both are +1 or −1), the spoofing signal is designed to constructively combine with the transmitter's original signal at the receiver to help improve the decoding reliability against Gaussian noise. In each of Type-II symbols (see Fig. 3-(b) ), where the original constellation point of the transmitter and the desirable one of the spoofer are opposite (one is +1 (or −1) but the other is −1 (or +1)), the spoofing signal is designed to destructively combine with the transmitter's original signal at the receiver, thus moving the constellation point towards the desirable opposite direction. We minimize the average SSER by optimizing the spoofing signals and their power allocations over Type-I and Type-II symbols at the spoofer, subject to its average transmit power constraint. Although this problem is non-convex, we derive its optimal solution. It is shown that when the transmit power at the malicious transmitter is low or the spoofing power at the spoofer is high, the spoofer should allocate its transmit power to both Type-I and Type-II symbols. Otherwise, when the transmit power at the malicious transmitter is high and the spoofing power at the spoofer is low, the spoofer should allocate almost all its transmit power over a certain percentage of Type-II symbols with an "on-off" power control.
• In the QPSK case with the constellation points being (±1 ± j )/ √ 2 with j = √ −1, the symbols are further classified into three types, where in Type-I, Type-II, and Type-III symbols, the original constellation points of the transmitter and the desirable ones of the spoofer are identical, opposite, and neighboring, respectively, as shown in Fig. 6 . For Type-I and Type-II symbols, the spoofing signals are designed to have equal strengths for the real and imaginary components, such that at the malicious receiver they can be constructively and destructively combined with the transmitter's original constellation points, respectively. For Type-III symbols, the spoofing signals are designed to have independent real and imaginary components. Under such a design, we formulate the average SSER minimization problem by optimizing the spoofing power allocations over symbols, subject to the average transmit power constraint. Though this problem is nonconvex and generally difficult, we obtain its optimal solution, motivated by that in the BPSK case.
• Numerical results show that for both BPSK and QPSK cases, the symbol-level spoofing scheme with optimized transmission achieves a much better spoofing performance (in terms of a lower average SSER), as compared to the block-level spoofing benchmark where the spoofer does not exploit the symbol information of the malicious transmitter, and a heuristically designed symbol-level spoofing scheme. It is worth noting that in the existing literature there is another type of higher-layer spoofing attack, which can also be utilized for wireless communication intervention (see, e.g., [2] , [17] - [19] ). For example, in the medium access control (MAC) spoofing [17] and Internet protocol (IP) spoofing, a network attacker can hide its true identity and impersonate another user, so as to access the targeted wireless networks and cause the data to be routed in dysfunctional ways instead of to the destination. In contrast, our proposed symbol-level spoofing is implemented at the physical layer, which can change the communicated information of ongoing malicious wireless communications, thus leading to a quicker response and intervention that is also more likely to be covert.
It is also worth comparing our proposed symbol-level spoofing versus the symbol-level precoding (not for security) in downlink multiuser multi-antenna systems [20] - [22] . In the symbol-level precoding, the transmitter designs its precoding vectors by exploiting the symbol-level relationships among the messages to different receivers, such that the constructive part of the inter-channel interference is preserved and exploited and only the destructive part is eliminated. Although the symbollevel spoofing and precoding are based on a similar design principle of exploiting the symbol-level relationship among co-channel signals, they focus on different application scenarios for different purposes, thus requiring different design methods. In addition, we note that the symbol-level precoding has been proposed to improve the security of wireless communications in [23] , instead of spoofing malicious wireless communications as in this paper.
Different from the conference version [1] that only focused on the BPSK modulation, this paper considers both BPSK and QPSK modulations. As will be shown in Section IV, the SSER expression under the QPSK modulation is more complicated than that under the BPSK modulation, which is due to the fact that the real and imaginary components of spoofing signals need to be individually designed. Hence, the derivation of the optimal power allocation becomes more challenging with more variables involved.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the system model and formulates the average SSER minimization problem. Sections III and IV propose the symbol-level spoofing approach and design the spoofing signals and their power allocations for the cases of BPSK and QPSK modulations, respectively. Section V presents numerical results to evaluate the performance of the proposed symbol-level spoofing design as compared to other benchmark schemes. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
As shown in Fig. 2 , we consider a fundamental threenode system over AWGN channels, where an intermediary legitimate spoofer aims to spoof a malicious wireless communication link from a malicious transmitter to a malicious receiver by changing the communicated data at the receiver side. We consider that the malicious communication employs the BPSK or QPSK modulation techniques, which are most commonly used in existing wireless communication systems. In the nth symbol of this block, we denote the transmitted signal by the transmitter as √ P x n , where P is the transmit power per symbol, and x n denotes the message that the transmitter wants to deliver to the receiver. Here, x n is equally likely chosen from the set of constellation points M , where M = {±1} and M = {(±1 ± j )/ √ 2} for the BPSK and QPSK cases, respectively. Therefore, we have |x n | 2 = 1.
First, we introduce the malicious receiver model by considering the case without spoofing. Accordingly, the received signal by the malicious receiver in the nth symbol is expressed as
where v n denotes the noise at the malicious receiver, which is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) random variable with zero mean and unit variance. Based on the maximum likelihood (ML) detection, the decoded message is expressed as arg min
Next, we consider the spoofing strategy employed by the spoofer. It is assumed that the spoofer perfectly knows the transmitted symbol information x n 's of the malicious transmitter via cooperating with the malicious users as a fake relay. Note that the assumption about the perfect symbol information has been made in the existing correlated jamming literature (see, e.g., [14] , [15] ) to improve the jamming performance. The similar assumption is made here to help characterize the spoofing performance upper bound. Based on the information of x n 's, let z n denote the spoofing signal transmitted by the spoofer in the nth symbol, where the design details of z n will be provided in the latter sections. Then, the received signal at the malicious receiver is expressed as
With the ML detection, the decoded message by the malicious receiver is expressed aŝ
The spoofer aims to maximize the opportunity of changing the messages of the malicious transmitter to be the desirable ones by itself. Letx n denote the desirable constellation point for the nth symbol, which is equally likely chosen from M and is independent from the message x n sent by the transmitter.
Nevertheless, due to the limited spoofing power and receiver noise, it is difficult for the spoofer to ensure that all symbolŝ x n 's are successfully changed to be the desirablex n 's. In this case, we define the probability of unsuccessful spoofing in any symbol n as the SSER, denoted by Pr(x n =x n ). 3 Then, the objective of the spoofer is to minimize the average SSER, i.e., E n Pr(x n =x n ) , where E n (·) denotes the statistical expectation over all possible symbols. Suppose that the spoofer is constrained by a maximum average transmit power denoted by Q, i.e., E n (|z n | 2 ) ≤ Q. As a result, the optimization problem of our interest is
In the following two sections, we will solve problem (5) by considering the BPSP and QPSK modulations, respectively.
III. OPTIMAL SYMBOL-LEVEL SPOOFING DESIGN WITH BPSK MODULATION
In this section, we consider the case with BPSK modulation, i.e., M = {±1}. In the following, we first propose the symbollevel spoofing signals design and then optimally solve the average SSER minimization problem (5) in this case.
A. Spoofing Signals Design and Problem Reformulation
To facilitate the description, as shown in the examples in Fig. 3 , we classify the symbols over each block into two types as follows based on the relationship between the original constellation point x n of the transmitter and the desirable onē x n of the spoofer in each symbol n.
• Type-I symbol: The symbol n is called a Type-I symbol if x n andx n are identical (x n =x n = +1 or x n =x n = −1). We denote the set of all Type-I symbols as N 1 .
• Type-II symbol: The symbol n is called a Type-II symbol if x n andx n are opposite (x n = +1 andx n = −1, or x n = −1 andx n = +1). We denote the set of all Type-II symbols as N 2 . In the following two propositions, we present the optimal symbol-level spoofing signal design, and obtain the corresponding SSER functions.
Proposition 1: Given any Type-I symbol n ∈ N 1 , it is optimal to minimize the conditional SSER Pr(x n =x n |x n =x n ) by designing z n = √ A n x n aligning with x n , where A n denotes the spoofing power for this symbol. Accordingly, Pr(x n =x n | x n =x n ) is given as
where erf(·) is the error function defined as
Proof: See Appendix A. Proposition 2: Given any Type-II symbol n ∈ N 2 , it is optimal to minimize the conditional SSER Pr(x n =x n | x n =x n ) by designing z n = − √ B n x n opposite to x n , where B n denotes the spoofing power for this symbol. Accordingly, Pr(x n =x n |x n =x n ) is given as
Proof: See Appendix B. Propositions 1 and 2 are intuitive. In each Type-I symbol, Proposition 1 shows that the spoofing signal should be designed such that at the malicious receiver it is constructively combined with the original signal from the transmitter, thus increasing the received power of the desirable constellation point against Gaussian noise. In each Type-II symbol, Proposition 2 shows that at the malicious receiver the spoofing signal should be destructively combined with the original signal from the transmitter, so as to move the constellation point towards the desirable opposite direction.
Based on these two propositions, the average SSER minimization problem (5) is specified as follows by jointly optimizing the spoofing power A n 's over Type-I symbols and B n 's over Type-II symbols.
where the term 1/2 follows from the fact that each of the two symbol sets N 1 and N 2 on average occupies a half of all symbols over each block. The spoofing power allocation problem (8) is generally non-convex, since the SSER function f 2 (B n ) in the objective is non-convex over B n ≥ 0 (as will be shown next). Therefore, this problem is difficult to solve. In the following, we first show some useful properties of the SSER functions f 1 (A n ) and f 2 (B n ), and then present the optimal solution to problem (8) .
B. Properties of the SSER Functions f
First, we have the following lemma for the SSER function
Lemma 3: f 1 (A n ) is monotonically decreasing and convex over A n ∈ [0, +∞).
Proof: It is easy to show that over A n ∈ [0, +∞), the firstand second-order derivatives of f 1 (A n ) satisfy that f 1 (A n ) ≤ 0 and f 1 (A n ) ≥ 0, respectively. Therefore, this lemma follows.
Next, we study the SSER function f 2 (B n ). Lemma 4: f 2 (B n ) is monotonically decreasing over B n ∈ [0, +∞). The convexity of f 2 (B n ) is given as follows depending on the malicious transmitter's transmit power P.
• The malicious transmitter's low transmit power regime (i.e., P ≤ 2):
, and finally convex over B n ∈ [ζ 2 , +∞), where the two boundary points ζ 1 < ζ 2 are given as
Proof: See Appendix C. In the malicious transmitter's high transmit power regime when P > 2, we further have the following property for f 2 (B n ).
Lemma 5: When P > 2, there exist two points τ 1 and τ 2 with 0 < τ 1 ≤ ζ 1 and τ 2 ≥ ζ 2 , such that all the points (B n , f 2 (B n )) are above the straight line passing through the two points (
Proof: See Appendix D. Note that the two points τ 1 and τ 2 can be found by using the iterative computation procedure in Appendix D. Also note that τ 1 should be strictly positive (though very small in general), since for Type-II symbols and at the zero spoofing power, the marginal SSER with respect to the spoofing power is negative infinity ( f 2 (0) = −∞).
For the purpose of illustration, Fig. 4 shows an example of f 2 (B n ) with P = 10 dB. It is observed that f 2 (B n ) is convex from 0 to ζ 1 = 0.0279, concave from ζ 1 to ζ 2 = 8.9721, and convex from ζ 2 to infinity. This is consistent with Lemma 4. Furthermore, it is observed that when the spoofing power B n is between τ 1 ≈ 0 and τ 2 = 13.7263, "timesharing" between the two spoofing powers τ 1 and τ 2 can achieve a lower SSER (or equivalently, a better spoofing performance) than using the spoofing power B n constantly. 4 This validates the structural property of f 2 (B n ) in Lemma 5, which is essential to help derive the optimal power allocation solution to problem (8) , as will be shown next.
Furthermore, Fig. 5 shows the values of ζ 1 , ζ 2 , τ 1 , and τ 2 versus the transmit power P at the malicious transmitter. It is observed that as P increases, the values of ζ 2 and τ 2 increase while those of ζ 1 and τ 1 decrease. When P > 3, the value of τ 2 is observed to be larger than P, while τ 1 is observed to be close to zero (though strictly positive).
C. Optimal Spoofing Power Allocation For Problem (8)
Now, we present the optimal solution to problem (8) by using the properties of f 1 (A n ) and f 2 (B n ) shown above. To help description, we define a new functionf 2 
where c =
Here, the points (B n , cB n + d) correspond to those on the straight line passing through the two points (τ 1 , f 2 (τ 1 )) and (τ 2 , f 2 (τ 2 )). Based on Lemma 5, it is evident thatf 2 (B n ) serves as a lower bound of f 2 (B n ) over B n ∈ (τ 1 , τ 2 ), and importantly,f 2 (B n ) is convex over B n ∈ [0, +∞). Accordingly, we define an auxiliary optimization problem min {A≥0},{B≥0}
which is convex and whose optimal solution is denoted as A * and B * . Here, since the strict equality A * + B * = 2Q should hold at the optimality of problem (12), A * and B * can be obtained by using a simple bisection search. Note that both A * and B * should be strictly positive, which is due to the fact that at the zero spoofing power, the marginal SSERs with respect to the spoofing power are both negative infinity ( f 1 (0) = −∞ and f 2 (0) = −∞).
With the help of A * and B * , we have the following proposition.
Proposition 6: The optimal solution of {A n } to problem (8) is given as A * n = A * , ∀n ∈ N 1 , and that of {B n } is given as follows by considering two cases.
• When P > 2 and B * ∈ (τ 1 , τ 2 ), the spoofer uses timesharing between the spoofing powers τ 1 and τ 2 , i.e., the (8) spoofer sets B * n = τ 1 over a γ fraction of the symbols in N 2 , and B * n = τ 2 over the remaining 1 − γ fraction in N 2 , where 0 < γ < 1 is uniquely chosen such that
• Otherwise, it follows that B * n = B * , ∀n ∈ N 2 . Proof: See Appendix E. Therefore, problem (8) is finally solved, and we summarize the algorithm to optimally solve it in Table I .
It is worth emphasizing that Proposition 6 shows the following interesting optimal spoofing power allocation strategies for the spoofer to minimize the average SSER.
• When the transmit power at the malicious transmitter is low (i.e., P ≤ 2) or the spoofing power at the spoofer is high (such that B * > τ 2 ), the spoofer should use the optimized constant transmit power over both Type-I and Type-II symbols. This is due to the fact that both SSER functions f 1 (A n ) and f 2 (B n ) are convex over such regimes.
• When the transmit power P at the malicious transmitter is high (i.e., P > 2) and the spoofing power Q at the spoofer is low 5 (such that τ 1 ≤ B * ≤ τ 2 ), the spoofer focuses its spoofing power over only a certain percentage of Type-II symbols with an "on-off" power control, i.e., the spoofer uses a large spoofing power (i.e., τ 2 > 0) over a 1 − γ portion of Type-II symbols, and uses nearly zero spoofing power over the other Type-II symbols. This is due to the fact that the SSER function f 2 (B n ) is non-convex over the regime of B n ∈ (τ 1 , τ 2 ), and thus it is beneficial for the spoofer to allocate almost all the power over a limited number of Type-II symbols.
IV. SYMBOL-LEVEL SPOOFING DESIGN WITH QPSK MODULATION
In this section, we consider the case with QPSK modulation, i.e., M {(±1 ± j )/ √ 2}. We first design the symbollevel spoofing signals and obtain the SSER functions under any given spoofing power, and then solve the average SSER minimization problem (5) in this case.
A. Spoofing Signals Design and Problem Reformulation
Similar to the BPSK case and as illustrated in the example in Fig. 6 , we classify the QPSK symbols into three types based on the relationship between the original constellation point x n 
of the malicious transmitter and the desirable onex n of the spoofer.
• Type-I symbol: The symbol n is called a Type-I symbol if x n andx n are identical (i.e., x n =x n ). The set of all Type-I symbols is denoted as N 1 .
• Type-II symbol: The symbol n is called a Type-II symbol if x n andx n are opposite (i.e., x n = −x n ). The set of all Type-II symbols is denoted as N 2 .
• Type-III symbol: The symbol n is called a Type-III symbol if x n andx n are neighboring. The set of all Type-III symbols is denoted as N 3 . Here, Type-I, Type-II, and Type-III symbols on average occupy 1/4, 1/4, and 1/2 portions of all symbols, respectively. To facilitate the description, we focus on one particular original constellation point x n = (1 + j )/ √ 2, and consider the desirable constellation point to bex n = (1
for Type-I, Type-II, and Type-III symbols, respectively. Under each of the three desirable constellation points, we will design the corresponding symbol-level spoofing signal and derive the SSER function under any given spoofing power. Note that the spoofing signals design for other symbols (i.e., Type-I, Type-II, and Type-III symbols other than those in Fig. 6 ) can be similarly devised to achieve the same SSER functions, and thus is omitted for brevity.
First, consider a particular Type-I symbol n ∈ N 1 with x n =x n = (1 + j )/ √ 2. In this case, the optimal spoofing signal is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 7: It is optimal to minimize the conditional SSER Pr(x n =x n |x n =x n = (1
, where A n denotes the given spoofing power for this Type-I symbol. Accordingly, Pr(x n =x n | x n =x n = (1 + j )/ √ 2) is given as
Proof: See Appendix F. Next, consider a particular Type-II symbol n ∈ N 2 with
In this case, it is difficult to rigorously derive the optimal spoofing signal design under any values of P. Nevertheless, we can provide the optimal spoofing signal in the special case of P ≤ 4 in the following proposition.
Proposition 8: In the case of P ≤ 4, it is optimal to minimize the conditional SSER Pr(x n =x n |x n = (1 
Proof: See Appendix G. For the remaining case of P > 4, it is difficult to prove the optimality of the spoofing signal design of
Nevertheless, such optimality is observed via extensive simulations. Therefore, we choose z n = √ B n (−1 − j )/ √ 2 for this particular Type-II symbol under any value of P, and accordingly, we have the conditional SSER as g 2 (B n ) in (14) .
Remark 9: From Propositions 7 and 8, it is observed that the optimally designed spoofing signals for Type-I and Type-II symbols have an equal strength in their respective real and imaginary components, such that at the malicious receiver they are constructively and destructively combined with the original signals of the malicious transmitter, respectively. The design of spoofing signals in Type-I and Type-II symbols in the QPSK case is similar to that in the BPSK case (see Propositions 1 and 2), but leading to different SSER functions due to their difference in the modulation order.
In addition, consider a particular Type-III symbol n ∈ N 3 with
In this case, we independently design the real and imaginary components of the spoofing signal, and generally set it to be z n = − C R n + j C I n , where the spoofing power is denoted as C R n + C I n . Under such a design, the conditional SSER is expressed as
Here, the derivation of (15) is based on a similar procedure as in the proof of Propositions 7 (see (29)), and thus is omitted for brevity. By combining the above three types of symbols, the average SSER minimization problem is reformulated as a spoofing power allocation problem among the three types of symbols, given as min
Problem (16) is nonconvex in general and thus difficult to solve. In the following, we show some useful properties of the three SSER functions, to help solve problem (16) .
B. Properties of the SSER Functions g
In this subsection, we show the monotonic properties and convexities of the three SSER functions.
Lemma 10: g 1 (A n ) is monotonically decreasing and convex over A n ∈ [0, +∞).
Proof: See Appendix H. For g 2 (B n ), it is very difficult for us to rigorously prove its convexity over the whole regime of B n ∈ [0, +∞]. We first provide the following lemma to analytically show its convexity under certain regimes, and then remark on its convexity in the general case.
Lemma 11: g 2 (B n ) is monotonically decreasing over B n ∈ [0, +∞). The convexity of g 2 (B n ) is given as follows.
• Under any value of P, there exists a small but positive χ 1 , such that g 2 (B n ) is convex over B n ∈ [0, χ 1 ], where χ 1 < ζ 1 with ζ 1 given in (9); • Under any value of P, g 2 (B n ) is convex over B n ∈ [χ 2 , +∞), where χ 2 is given as follows and χ 2 > ζ 2 with ζ 2 given in (10);
Proof: See Appendix I. Remark 12: Note that in Lemma 11, we cannot analytically show the convexity of g 2 (B n ) in the regime of B n ∈ (ζ 1 , χ 1 )∪ (ζ 2 , χ 2 ), and thus in the whole regime of B n ∈ [0, +∞). Despite this fact, via extensive simulations, we numerically find that g 2 (B n ) has a similar convexity property as f 2 (B n ) in Proposition 4. That is, under the malicious transmitter's low transmit power regime (particularly, when P is no larger than a boundary point ξ ≈ 1.146), g 2 (B n ) is convex over B n ∈ [0, +∞); whereas under the malicious transmitter's high transmit power regime (when P > ξ ≈ 1.146), there exist two points 0 ≤ζ 1 ≤ζ 2 such that g 2 (B n ) is first convex over [0,ζ 1 ], then concave over (ζ 1 ,ζ 2 ), and finally convex over [ζ 2 , +∞). In the latter case, it follows similar to Lemma 5 that there exist two pointsτ 1 andτ 2 with 0 <τ 1 ≤ζ 1 andτ 2 ≥ζ 2 , such that all the points (B n , g 2 (B n )) are above the straight line passing through the two points (τ 1 , g 2 (τ 1 )) and (τ 2 , g 2 (τ 2 )). Note that under any given value of P, the values ofζ 1 andζ 2 can be numerically found by checking the second-order derivatives of g 2 (B n ); and based on them we can obtainτ 1 andτ 2 by using a similar procedure as that in Appendix D.
Next, we consider the SSER function g 3 (C R n , C I n ) for the Type-III symbols. We rewrite g 3 
Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 13: g I 3 (C I n ) is monotonically increasing and concave over C I n ∈ [0, +∞). g R 3 (C R n ) is monotonically increasing over C R n ∈ [0, +∞). The convexity of g R 3 (C R n ) is given as follows depending on the malicious transmitter's transmit power P.
• The malicious transmitter's low transmit power regime (i.e., P ≤ 4): The results in Lemmas 11 and 13 will play important roles in the design of the spoofing power allocation to solve problem (16), as will be shown next. (16) In this subsection, we propose the optimal solution to problem (16) by using the properties of the SSER functions shown in the proceeding subsection. First, we define two auxiliary SSER functions for Type-II and Type-III symbols to facilitate the derivation. For Type-II symbols, we define an auxiliary SSER functionḡ 2 (B n ), where if P ≤ ξ ≈ 1.146, we haveḡ 2 (B n ) = g 2 (B n ), ∀B n ∈ [0, +∞); whereas if P > ξ ≈ 1.146, it follows that
C. Spoofing Power Allocation for Problem
Here, the points (B n ,cB n +d) correspond to those on the straight line passing through the two points (τ 1 , g 2 (τ 1 )) and (τ 2 , g 2 (τ 2 )). Based on Lemma 5, it is evident thatḡ 2 (B n ) serves as a lower bound of g 2 (B n ) over B n ∈ (τ 1 ,τ 2 ), and importantly,ḡ 2 (B n ) is convex over B n ∈ [0, +∞).
In addition, we consider Type-III symbols, and define another auxiliary function
where if P ≤ 4, we haveḡ R 3 (C R n ) = g R 3 (C R n ); whereas if P > 4, it follows that
Here, the points (C R n ,ĉC R n +d) correspond to those on the straight line passing through the two points (τ 1 , g 3 R (τ 1 )) and (τ 2 , g 3 R (τ 2 )). Based on Lemma 13, it is evident thatḡ R 3 (C R n ) serves as an upper τ 2 ) , and accordingly,
By combining the above discussions for the three types of symbols, we solve problem (16) by solving the following auxiliary problem:
Note that problem (21) itself is non-convex due to the coupling ofḡ R 3 (C R ) and g I 3 (C I ). Nevertheless, under any given C R ≥ 0, the optimization over A, B, and C I becomes a convex optimization problem. As a result, we use a one-dimensional search over C R ∈ [0, 2Q], and solve the convex optimization problem in (21) under any given C R to obtain the optimal A, B, and C I . Therefore, problem (21) is optimally solved, for which the corresponding spoofing power allocation solution is denoted as A * * , B * * , C R * * , and C I * * , respectively. Then we obtain the optimal spoofing signals design for problem (16) as given in the following proposition.
Proposition 14: The spoofing power allocation solution of {A n } and {C I n } to problem (16) is given as A * * n = A * * , ∀n ∈ N 1 , and C I * * n = C I * * , ∀n ∈ N 3 , and that of {B n } and {C R n } is given as follows.
• When P > ξ ≈ 1.146 and B * * ∈ (τ 1 ,τ 2 ), the spoofer uses time-sharing between the spoofing powerτ 1 andτ 2 , i.e., the spoofer sets B * n =τ 1 over aγ fraction of the symbols in N 2 , and B * n =τ 2 over the remaining 1 −γ fraction in N 2 , where 0 <γ < 1 is uniquely chosen such thatγτ 1 + (1 −γ )τ 2 = B * * ; otherwise, it follows that B * * n = B * * , ∀n ∈ N 2 .
• When P > 4 and C R * * ∈ (τ 1 ,τ 2 ), the spoofer uses timesharing between the spoofing powerτ 1 andτ 2 , i.e., the spoofer sets C R * * n =τ 1 over aγ fraction of the symbols in N 2 , and C R * * n =τ 2 over the remaining 1 −γ fraction in N 2 , where 0 <γ < 1 is uniquely chosen such that γτ 1 + (1 −γ )τ 2 = C R * * ; otherwise, it follows that C R * * n = C R * * , ∀n ∈ N 3 . Proof: This proposition can be proved following similar procedures as that for Proposition 6. Therefore, the details are omitted for brevity.
Therefore, problem (16) is finally solved, and we summarize the algorithm to solve it in Table II .
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to show the performance of our proposed symbol-level spoofing with optimized power allocation, as compared with two benchmark schemes in the following.
1) Block-Level Spoofing:
In this scheme, the spoofer is assumed to be not aware of the original symbol information x n from the malicious transmitter. In this scheme, the spoofer uses the constant transmit power Q over all symbols 6 and sets the spoofing signal to be the exact desirable constellation pointx n , i.e., z n = √ Qx n .
2) Heuristic Symbol-Level Spoofing:
In this scheme, the spoofer designs its spoofing signals by only heuristically exploiting the symbol-level relationship between the original constellation points of the malicious transmitter and the desirable one of the spoofer, but without the sophisticated transmit optimization as in our proposed optimal symbol-level spoofing. In particular, for Type-I symbols, the spoofer does not allocate any spoofing power to them, since the original and desirable constellation points are already identical; for other symbols (i.e., Type-II symbols for the BPSK case, as well as Type-II and Type-III symbols for the QPSK case), the spoofer equally allocates its spoofing power to each of them. As a result, in the BPSK case, the spoofing powers allocated for each Type-I and Type-II symbols are 0 and 2Q, respectively, and the resultant average SSER is given as
In the QPSK case, the spoofing powers allocated for each Type-I, Type-II, and Type-III symbols are 0, 4Q/3, and 4Q/3, respectively, and the resultant average SSER is given to be In the simulation, we show the average SSER by considering the transmit power P at the malicious transmitter and the average spoofing power Q at the legitimate spoofer as two parameters. To obtain the average SSER, we first compute the respective SSER under each type of symbols (i.e., f 1 (A n ) and f 2 (B n ) for Type-I and Type-II symbols with BPSK, and g 1 (A n ), g 2 (B n ) and g 3 (C R n , C I n ) for Type-I, Type-II, and Type-III symbols with QPSK), and then averaging them. First, consider the BPSK modulation. Fig. 7 shows the optimal spoofing power allocation versus the average spoofing power Q, where the transmit power at the malicious transmitter is set as P = 10 dB. It is observed that when Q is small (i.e., Q ≤ 13 dB), almost all the spoofing power is reserved for Type-II symbols to move the constellation points efficiently towards the desirable opposite directions; whereas when Q becomes large (i.e., Q > 13 dB), the spoofing power is allocated more fairly between Type-I and Type-II symbols. Particularly, in the small Q regime when Q < 8.366 dB, it is observed that an "on-off" time-sharing strategy between the spoofing power τ 1 ≈ 0 and τ 2 = 13.726 should be employed over Type-II symbols. In other words, in this regime, the spoofer should focus its spoofing power on a certain portion of Type-II symbols. Fig. 8 shows the average SSER performance of the three schemes versus the spoofing power Q in the BPSK case, where the transmit power at the malicious transmitter is set as P = 10 dB. It is observed that the optimal symbol-level spoofing achieves a better performance (or equivalently, a lower average SSER) than the block-level spoofing benchmark. In particular, over 3 dB performance gain is obtained by the symbol-level spoofing when the average spoofing power Q becomes large. It is also observed that the optimal symbollevel spoofing leads to a lower average SSER than the heuristic symbol-level spoofing when Q < 8.366 dB and Q > 13 dB, and the two schemes have a similar average SSER performance when the value of Q is between 8.366 dB and 13 dB. The results can be explained based on the optimal spoofing power allocation shown in Fig. 7 . When Q < 8.366 dB, the optimal symbol-level spoofing employs an "on-off" transmission strategy with time-sharing between the spoofing power τ 1 ≈ 0 and τ 2 = 13.726, thus outperforming Fig. 9 . Average SSER performance in the QPSK case, where the transmit power at the malicious transmitter is set as P = 10 dB. the heuristic one that uses fixed spoofing power over all Type-II symbols. When Q > 13 dB, the optimal symbol-level spoofing allocates the spoofing power more fairly between Type-I and Type-II symbols, thus reducing the average SSER as compared to the heuristic one that only allocates the spoofing power to Type-II symbols. These results show the significance of our proposed optimal spoofing power allocation. In addition, it is observed that the heuristic symbol-level spoofing performs worse than the block-level spoofing when Q becomes large, which is due to the fact that the heuristic symbol-level spoofing does not allocate any spoofing power to the Type-I symbols, which leads to the average SSER floor.
Next, consider the QPSK modulation. Fig. 9 shows the average SSER achieved by the three schemes versus the average spoofing power Q, where the transmit power at the malicious transmitter is set as P = 10 dB. Similar to the BPSK modulation as in Fig. 8 , the optimal symbol-level spoofing is observed to achieve significantly lower SSER than the block-level spoofing, and over 5 dB average SSER reduction is obtained when Q becomes large. Furthermore, the optimal symbol-level spoofing achieves lower average SSER than the heuristic symbol-level spoofing under any value of Q. Based on these observations, it follows that the optimal spoofing power allocation is more important with higher-order modulations.
A. The Case With Practical Error-Correcting Coding
It is worth noting that although we only considered uncoded modulations in this paper, our results are applicable to the case when the malicious transmitter employs error-correcting codes. To implement the symbol-level spoofing in this case, the legitimate spoofer just needs to first obtain the employed codes for the malicious communication (by cooperating with the malicious users as a fake relay), and then use the same error-correcting codes to encode the desired information and design the spoofing signal.
First, for the purpose of explanation, we consider a simple example with a binary repetition code of length 3, where the information bits 1 and 0 are encoded to be all ones 111 and all zeros 000, respectively. Suppose that the malicious transmitter needs to transmit one bit 1 (or 0) with the Average SBER performance comparison (with the BPSK modulation) between the case with convolutional coding and the case without any error-correcting coding, where P = 10 dB.
BPSK modulation. After repetition coding and BPSK modulation, the malicious transmitter should use three symbols (+1, +1, +1) (or (−1, −1, −1)) for x n 's to deliver such one bit of information. To spoof this bit via the symbol-level spoofing, the spoofer encodes its desirable bit by using the same repetition code, and then implements the symbol-level spoofing over each of the three symbols. If the spoofer's desirable bit is 0 (or 1), the desirable messages are encoded as 000 (or 111) and then modulated to be three symbols (−1, −1, −1) (or (+1, +1, +1)) forx n 's, based on which the spoofer can design the spoofing signal z n for each symbol by independently solving problem (5) . Under such a design, all the three symbols received at the malicious receiver will be spoofed, and after demodulation and decoding, its decoded information bit will be changed to be the spoofer's desirable bit with a high probability, no matter whether soft or hard decoding is employed. Therefore, the symbol-level spoofing will be successful and applicable.
Next, we consider a more complicated convolutional coding that has been widely employed in practical wireless communication systems. Similar to the case of employing the binary repetition code, the malicious transmitter here encodes the source bits via the convolutional coding, and employs the BPSK modulation to obtain the transmitted symbols x n 's. At the same time, the spoofer employs the same coding and modulation over its desirable bits to get the desirable symbols x n 's, and then implements the symbol-level spoofing over each of these symbols independently. At the receiver side, the malicious receiver employs the reverse demodulation and decoding based on the received symbols. In this case, we define the SBER as the average probability for the information bits decoded by the malicious receiver that fail to be changed as the desirable ones of the spoofer. Fig. 10 compares the SBER performance by the symbol-level spoofing between the case with convolutional coding and the case without any error-correcting coding. We choose the average transmit power at the malicious transmitter as P = 10 dB. For the employed convolutional code, we set the rate to be 1/3, and the constraint length to be 7. It is observed that when the average spoofing power Q is much smaller than P (i.e., Q ≤ 5 dB), the achieved SBER in the case with convolutional coding is larger than that without any channel coding. By contrast, it is observed that when Q ≥ 6 dB, the case with convolutional coding considerably outperforms that without coding (in terms of lower SBER). More specifically, when Q ≈ 8.5 dB < P, an almost zero SBER is achievable thanks to the advantage of convolutional coding. This shows that as long as the average spoofing power Q is larger than a certain threshold, the adoption of error-correcting codes indeed helps the legitimate spoofer to achieve a more energy-efficient symbol-level spoofing.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper proposed spoofing attacks in the physical layer for the legitimate intervention of malicious wireless communications. We proposed a new symbol-level spoofing approach for a legitimate spoofer to change the messages transmitted in a malicious link. With knowledge of the original constellation points by the malicious transmitter, the spoofer exploits the correlations between its desirable constellation points and the original ones by the malicious transmitter to improve the spoofing performance. In particular, we developed optimal spoofing signals design and power allocation in the cases of BPSK and QPSK modulations. Due to the space limitation, there have been various issues that have not been addressed in this paper, which are briefly mentioned in the following to motivate future work.
First, this paper focused on the uncoded BPSK and QPSK modulations over AWGN channels. How to extend the symbollevel spoofing into general modulation techniques (such as M-PSK and M-QAM modulations with M > 4) with channel coding under practical cases with fading channels and imperfect/partial transmitted message knowledge are interesting problems worth pursuing in the future.
Next, in this paper we showed that the symbol-level spoofing was difficult to be discovered by the malicious users and thus we assumed that they were unaware of the spoofing. Nevertheless, if the malicious transmitter is able to detect the spoofing attack (via advanced detection techniques), it may perform other anti-spoofing techniques such as frequency hopping to avoid mixing its signal with the one transmitted by the spoofer. In this case, the spoofer needs to use the channel scanning [25] to find the operating frequency bands of the malicious communication before employing the symbol-level spoofing. It is an interesting topic to use game theory as an efficient tool to characterize the interplay between the symbollevel spoofing (with channel scanning) and its countermeasures (such as frequency hopping) (see, e.g., [26] ).
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Consider a typical Type-I symbol n ∈ N 1 with x n =x n . In this case, the SSER Pr(x n =x n |x n =x n ) is expressed as
where (22) follows from [24, Chapter 5] based on the ML detection in (4), and (23) holds from (3) . In this case, to minimize the SSER in (23), we should set the phase of z n to be same as that of x n , and accordingly we have z n = √ A n x n . In this case, note that the term in (23) is only dependent on the real part of the CSCG random variable v n , which is a real Gaussian random variable denoted byv n with zero mean and variance 1/2. Therefore, we further express the function Pr(x n =x n |x n =x n ) as
where (24) holds due to the fact thatv n /x n is also a real Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance 1/2. Therefore, this proposition is proved.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of this proposition is similar to that in Appendix A for Proposition 1, and thus is provided here briefly. Consider a typical Type-II symbol n ∈ N 2 with x n = −x n . In this case, the SSER Pr(x n =x n |x n = −x n ) is expressed as
In this case, to minimize the SSER in (25), we should set the phase of z n to be same as that of x n , and accordingly we have z n = − √ B n x n . Therefore, we further express the function Pr(x n =x n |x n =x n ) as
Therefore, this proposition is proved.
C. Proof of Lemma 4
First, the first-order derivative of f 2 (B n ) is given as
is monotonically decreasing over B n ∈ [0, +∞). Next, we have the second-order derivative of f 2 (B n ) as
2B n − 2 √ P B n + 1 , based on which we consider the following two cases when P ≤ 2 and P > 2, respectively.
• In the malicious transmitter's low transmit power regime (i.e., P ≤ 2), it can be shown that f 2 (B n ) ≥ 0 always holds, and therefore, f 2 (B n ) is convex over B n ∈ [0, +∞). • In the malicious transmitter's high transmit power regime (i.e., P > 2), the equation f 2 (B n ) = 0 (equivalently, 2B n − 2 √ P B n + 1 = 0) has two solutions given as ζ 1 and ζ 2 in (9) and (10) 
D. Proof of Lemma 5
We prove this lemma via two steps. First, we find two points (τ 1 , f 2 (τ 1 )) and (τ 2 , f 2 (τ 2 )) with 0 < τ 1 ≤ ζ 1 and
denotes the slope of the straight line passing through (τ 1 , f 2 (τ 1 )) and (τ 2 , f 2 (τ 2 )) . Then, we show that all the points (B n , f 2 (B n )) are above the straight line passing through such two points.
First, we find such two points ( τ 2 ) via the following procedure. To start with, we setτ 1 
i.e., the slope of the line passing through
and f 2 (ζ 2 ). Then, we proceed as follows.
• In the first step, we decrease the value ofτ 1 to find a neŵ
, and thus decreasingτ 1 leads to the decrease of f 2 (τ 1 ) and the increase of θ(τ 1 ,τ 2 ).
Based on this fact together with f 2 (0) = −∞, such a pointτ 1 can be obtained via bisection. For this newly foundτ 1 , it follows that
• In the second step, we increase the value ofτ 2 to find a newτ 2 
Note that f 2 (B n ) is convex over B n ∈ [ζ 2 , +∞), and thus increasingτ 2 leads to the increase of f 2 (τ 2 ) and the decrease of θ(τ 1 ,τ 2 ). Based on this fact together with f 2 (+∞) = 0, such a pointτ 2 can be obtained via bisection. For this newly foundτ 2 , it follows that
• By iteratively implementing the above two steps, f 2 (ζ 1 ) is strictly increased and f 2 (ζ 2 ) is strictly decreased, while θ(τ 1 ,τ 2 ) is always between them. Note that f 2 (B n ) is continuous and second-order differentiable. By using this fact together with f 2 (0) = −∞ and f 2 (+∞) = 0, it is evident that there exist two finite extreme points τ 1 and
. Next, we prove that all the points (B n , f 2 (B n )) are above the line passing through (τ 1 , f 2 (τ 1 )) and (τ 2 , f 2 (τ 2 )). First, consider the regimes with B n ∈ [0, ζ 1 ] and B n ∈ [ζ 2 , +∞). Since the function f 2 (B n ) is convex over this regime, and
, it is evident that over such two regimes, the points (B n , f 2 (B n )) are above the line passing through (τ 1 , f 2 (τ 1 )) and (τ 2 , f 2 (τ 2 )). Then, consider the regime with B n ∈ [ζ 1 , ζ 2 ]. Since f 2 (B n ) is concave over this regime, the points (B n , f 2 (B n )) are above the line passing through (ζ 1 , f 2 (ζ 1 )) and (ζ 2 , f 2 (ζ 2 )), and thus are also above that passing through (τ 1 , f 2 (τ 1 )) and (τ 2 , f 2 (τ 2 )) .
By combining the above two steps, this lemma is proved.
E. Proof of Proposition 6
To start with, we define another auxiliary problem
which is obtained based on problem (8) by replacing f 2 (B n ) asf 2 (B n ). It is evident that the optimal value of problem (27) is a lower bound on that of problem (8) . Therefore, if the objective value of problem (8) achieved by the solution in this proposition is same as the optimal value of problem (27), then such a solution is optimal for problem (8) . We prove this proposition based on this observation. First, we show that the optimal solution to problem (27) is given as A * n = A * , ∀n ∈ N 1 and B * n = B * , ∀n ∈ N 2 . Note that both f 1 (A n ) and f 2 (B n ) are convex, and therefore, there exists an optimal power allocation solution in which the spoofing power A n 's and B n 's remain constant over n ∈ N 1 and n ∈ N 2 , respectively. Therefore, we can express A n = A, ∀n ∈ N 1 and B n = B, ∀n ∈ N 2 . Accordingly, problem (27) is degenerated to be problem (12) . As a result, the optimal solution to problem (27) is A * n = A * , ∀n ∈ N 1 and B * n = B * , ∀n ∈ N 2 . Next, based on (11) and Lemma 5, it is easy to verify that the objective value of problem (8) achieved by the solution in this proposition is same as the optimal value of problem (27) achieved by A * n = A * , ∀n ∈ N 1 and B * n = B * , ∀n ∈ N 2 . Therefore, this proposition is proved.
F. Proof of Proposition 7
Consider one particular Type-I symbol with x n =x n = 1+ j √ 2 . Let the real and imaginary components of the spoofing signal z n be denoted as z R n and z I n , and those of y n as y R n and y I n , respectively. Then y R n and y I n are two real Gaussian random variables with mean values of √ P/2 + z R n and √ P/2 + z I n , respectively, as well as variance of 1/2. As a result, the joint PDF of y R n and y I n is given as
Note that the spoofing is successful when the phase of y n lies between 0 and π/2 (within the detection regime), i.e., the real and imaginary components of y n are both positive. Therefore, the conditional SSER under given z R n and z I n is given as 
To minimize the above conditional SSER under the given transmit power A n , i.e., z R n 2 + z I n 2 = A n , it is desirable to set z R n ≥ 0 and z I n ≥ 0. As a result, obtaining z R n and z I n is equivalent to solving the following problem: 
Note that the function ln is obtained asẑ R n =ẑ I n = A n /2. Therefore, the optimality of the problem (30) is achieved when z R n = z I n = √ A n /2. By using this together with (29), the conditional SSER in (13) is obtained. Therefore, this proposition is proved.
G. Proof of Proposition 8
Similar to the proof of Proposition 7, the joint PDF of y R n and y I n is given in (28). Note that the spoofing is successful when the phase of y n lies between π and 3π/2, i.e., the real and imaginary components of y n are both negative. As a result, the conditional SSER Pr(x n =x n |x n =x n = (1 + j )/ √ 2) is given as 
To minimize the above conditional SSER under the given spoofing power B n , i.e., z R n 2 + z I n 2 = B n , it is desirable to set z R n ≤ 0 and z I n ≤ 0. As a result, obtaining z R n and z I n is equivalent to solving the following problem: 
By replacing z R n and z R n as − ẑ R n and − ẑ I n , problem (32) is recast as 
Note that when P ≤ 4, ln √ z − √ P/2 is concave, and therefore, the optimality of problem (33) is obtained asẑ R n =ẑ I n = B n /2. As a result, the optimality of problem (32) is achieved when z R n = z I n = − √ B n /2. By using this together with (31), the conditional SSER in (14) is obtained. Therefore, this proposition is proved.
H. Proof of Lemma 10
It is evident that g 1 (A n ) is monotonically decreasing over A n ≥ 0. Therefore, we only need to show its convexity. The second-order derivative of g 1 (A n ) is given as 
Note that A n < e A n for all A n > 0, and therefore, 
I. Proof of Proposition 11
It is easy to see that g 2 (B n ) is monotonically decreasing over B n ∈ [0, +∞). It thus remains to show its convexity. The second-order derivative of g 2 (B n ) is given as 
First, it is easy to see that g 2 (B n ) → +∞ as B n → 0, and g 2 (ζ 1 ) < 0. Since g 2 (B n ) is a continuous function, there always exists a positive χ 1 with χ 1 < ζ 1 , such that over B n ∈ [0, χ 1 ] we have g 2 (B n ) ≥ 0, i.e., g 2 (B n ) is convex.
Next, note that when B n ≥ P, it follows that 1 + erf( 
